19 Feb. 1946 Q. In other words, Japan was anxious to have some understanding with Russia so that in the event of hostilities between Japan and the United States Japan would be relieved from the possibility of any attack or other pressure from Russia. Is that right? A. Yes, but this is only my own opinion and belief. Q. What did MATSUOKA indicate to you while he was with you in Europe as his reason for desiring to obtain this Non-Aggression Pact with Russia? A. He did not tell me his reasons, but I believe they were somewhat along the lines I have just recounted. Q. General, while MATSUOKA was in Europe did you at any time attempt to dissuade him from seeking this Non-Aggression Pact with Russia? A. No. But I did speak to him about how he should be very careful in giving out any large concessions in return for this pact. Q. Why? What was your reason for that? A. I will speak to you fully about this tomorrow if you wish, but to put it briefly I felt that changing conditions of the times would perhaps not make it a wise move to hurriedly consummate such a pact. Hitler himself had pressed Japan to make such a treaty - you will find this in his writings, I believe. But I felt that it was a time when we should think it over a little further in case we should be forced to make any concessions, such as giving up Sakhalin or parts of Manchuria. Q. All right, General, we will be back tomorrow and I want you to continue with your narrative from the point at which we left off yesterday, and as you narrate these events to us that you have in mind I will expect you, of course, to cover the matters that we referred to today with respect to which you have stated that you had planned to speak fully in the course of your narrative. 112