1 Feb. 1330-1610 hours Q. At that point, was this before you communicated the propositions to the General Staff in Tokyo or after? A. After. Q. So that notwithstanding the fact that you received no reply from your communication to GHQ in Tokyo, you, nevertheless, continued your conversations with Hack as the personal emissary of Ribbentrop as to this same subject? A. No, as far as Ribbentrop was concerned, I had cut off talks, but this man, Hack, kept coming around because of his airplane dealings and at such times he kept pressing me on the matter. Q. Did you have an idea that probably Hack would carry these ideas back to Ribbentrop? A. Naturally, I thought so. However, I could not definitely give any answers, unless I know exactly how GHQ felt. Q. Continue with the story. A. Subsequent to this Ribbentrop said that he wished to see me and I met him for the very first time at Hack’s home in October of that year. At this meeting Ribbentrop said that this was simply his own idea and he did not know how Hitler or the Government felt about it, and he said further that he believed there would be some possibility of its being put into effect. However, he asked me what the Japanese Military would think about it, and I said that there was no way of knowing, so that he asked me to find out exactly how they would feel, and he asked me to communicate with the Japanese Military and find out how they would feel about it. I subsequently sent the telegram to GHQ about the matter. At this time Ribbentrop stressed the fact that this was his own personal idea and for me not to feel bad about matters in case the German Government did not back him up - I said the same thing in regard to my own Government. Q. This is the second communication to Tokyo relative to this proposal? A. Yes. Q. Continue. A. (Hack was at this meeting and there were just the three of us.) Following this communication of mine to Japan I received the reply from GHQ that there was no overall opposition to the proposal, but that they wished to look into the matters more fully before they committed themselves, and in this regard they would send Lt. Col. Wakamatsu of the German division of GHQ. This officer arrived in Berlin in early December 1935, I believe, although I am not too sure of dates. During this interim I did not have any communication with Ribbentrop. Q. Did you have any communication with your own Foreign Office relative to this commun-ication? A. No. This was simply a military matter. Prior to Lt. Col. Wakamatsu’s arriving in Berlin Hack came to see me several times and I told him that he should wait until the arrival of the aforementioned officer. When he came I took the Colonel to see Ribbentrop and also General Blomberg and Wakamatsu told them that GHQ was in favor of a more or less general treaty, but that it was his duty, as this was still given only as Ribbentrop’s personal idea, to find out what the German Government felt about it. Also Wakamatsu stated that while the Japanese Army favored it, to bring it into fruition the Government would have to be consulted. 21