Summary supervision, intensified their use of White Russians. 2 In January 1938, OSHIMA says, Ribbentrop asked him if there was not some way in which Germany and Japan might be brought closer together by means of a treaty or otherwise. This suggestion was passed on to General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo. In June of that year OSHIMA received word that the General Staff approved the furtherance of German-Japanese cooperation with Russia as the object of the accord. OSHIMA then approached Ribbentrop asking what he would think of an agreement to the effect that Japan and Germany would consult with each other before any action was taken in case of an attack by Russia. Later Ribbentrop, who was now Foreign Minister, countered with the suggestion of mutual aid aimed not alone at Russia but at all countries. OSHIMA says he suggested Japan was only prepared to act against Russia and it would be difficult to expand so far. Major General Kasahara was then sent to Japan to the General Staff headquarters with the German suggestions. The Army took the matter up with the Foreign Minister and the big five of the Cabinet. OSHIMA, in unprecedented time, received a telegram from the General Staff that they were more or less in accord with the proposal - this was before a formal German proposal had been made. OSHIMA says Japan was willing to conclude a pact promising mutual aid in case one of the signatories was a victim of unprovoked aggression, but that his Government wished the pact aimed at Russia primarily, and all other countries would be secondary. In September 1938, negotiations reached the stage where the Foreign Office took them over. By that time OSHIMA, as Military Attache, had received several communications from the General Staff urging him to accept the post of Ambassador to Berlin, which he did in October 1938. He replaced Ambassador TOGO who was not a military man and who wished this pact only in so far as Russia was concerned. The negotiations were then continued by OSHIMA, as Ambassador. (He had to retire as a Lieutenant General when he assumed that post.) The new Ambassador then received word from Tokyo that they were in agreement on the treaty but were studying the language of the proposal. Among the reasons advanced for the treaty was a desire to conclude the China Incident 3 - to clarify the Russian situation so that Japanese troops along the Siberian border could be deployed elsewhere. OSHIMA admitted this meant those troops could then be used against China. Kasahara returned to Berlin in the meantime and following numerous talks with Ribbentrop OSHIMA officially transmitted the plan to Tokyo who replied the proposal was being studied. More delays ensued and in December 1938, OSHIMA asked the Foreign Office why he did not receive an answer. He was then told the matter of naming Russia as the primary object and the other nations as secondary was their main pressing concern. In order to avoid arguments with Germany they wanted the point clarified before proceeding any further. The Ito Commission was then sent to Berlin with instructions outlining the limits to which OSHIMA could go in the matter. In the meantime in September 1938, Ribbentrop approached Italy on the subject of joining the pact but was unsuccessful. In December 1938, OSHIMA went to Italy and conferred with Mussolini on the proposal but did not succeed in getting an agreement that Italy would join. SHIRATORI was then named Ambassador from Japan to Italy and very soon after his arrival in Rome Mussolini informed 2 After Lenin and the Bolsheviks seized control of the Government, there was a civil war in Russia. The “White Russians” was the group which fought the “Red Army” of the Bolsheviks. In 1918 they had support from several countries including the United States and Japan. Although the “White Russians” lost this war, there were still people who were identified as “White Russians” in the 1930’s and “use of White Russians” is referring to these people who wanted to overthrow the Communist government of Stalin. 3 This refers to the Invasion of China. 7